Security Incident Response
Purpose
This governance document defines MANDATORY requirements for the technical layer of security incident response: detection-to-escalation chains, incident classification, evidence preservation, regulatory notification timelines, and post-incident review. It does not prescribe organisation-specific runbooks, communication chains, or role assignments — those vary by organisation size, jurisdiction, and team structure. The standard specifies what the IRP must cover; organisations define how.
Normative language (MUST, MUST NOT, SHOULD, MAY) follows RFC 2119 semantics.
Rules
R-1: Incident Response Plan (IRP)
Every organisation operating production systems MUST maintain a documented Incident Response Plan. The IRP MUST cover:
- Incident classification criteria and severity definitions (see R-2)
- Detection-to-escalation time targets per severity tier (see R-3)
- Evidence preservation procedures (see R-4)
- Regulatory notification timelines for each applicable framework (see R-5)
- Post-incident review process (see R-7)
The IRP MUST be reviewed and updated at minimum annually and after any severity P1 or P2 incident.
R-2: Incident Classification
Every detected security event MUST be classified by severity within 30 minutes of initial detection. The following four-tier model MUST be used or mapped to an equivalent organisational scheme:
| Severity | Criteria | Examples |
|---|---|---|
| P1 — Critical | Active breach; data exfiltration confirmed or suspected; complete system compromise; ransomware active | Confirmed credential theft at scale; active exfiltration of Restricted-tier data; encryption by ransomware |
| P2 — High | Unauthorised access confirmed; significant data exposure; service integrity compromised | Exposed database credentials in public repo; unauthenticated access to internal API; supply chain compromise detected |
| P3 — Medium | Attempted attack, no confirmed impact; suspicious activity requiring investigation | Brute-force campaign on authentication endpoints; anomalous data access patterns; unpatched critical CVE in production |
| P4 — Low | Policy violations; informational; no confirmed malicious activity | Misconfigured logging; failed security scan; phishing email reported by user (no click) |
Initial classification MAY be revised as investigation reveals more information. Revision MUST be recorded with rationale.
R-3: Detection-to-Escalation Timelines
The following maximum times apply from the moment a security event is first detected (logged, alerted, or reported) to the moment it is escalated to the designated incident owner:
| Severity | Detection to Escalation | Escalation to Investigation Start |
|---|---|---|
| P1 — Critical | 15 minutes | 30 minutes |
| P2 — High | 1 hour | 2 hours |
| P3 — Medium | 4 hours | 24 hours |
| P4 — Low | 24 hours | 72 hours |
Timelines apply 24×7 for P1 and P2. Organisations MUST define an on-call rotation or equivalent that ensures P1/P2 escalation can occur outside business hours.
After investigation start, a containment action MUST be taken or explicitly documented as infeasible (with reasoning) within:
- P1: 2 hours
- P2: 8 hours
R-4: Evidence Preservation
From the moment a P1 or P2 incident is declared, evidence MUST be preserved:
- Security logs per SEC-STD-004 MUST be flagged for preservation and MUST NOT be deleted or overwritten for the duration of the incident plus 90 days, regardless of normal retention policies
- System snapshots, memory dumps, or container images SHOULD be captured before any remediation action that would destroy forensic state; if operational necessity requires immediate remediation without prior capture, the decision MUST be logged with timestamp and approver
- All incident-related evidence MUST maintain chain of custody: record what was collected, when, by whom, and where it is stored; evidence MUST NOT be modified after collection
- For incidents involving regulatory notification (see R-5), preserve all evidence until legal hold is explicitly lifted
Evidence MUST be stored in a location separate from the affected systems and accessible only to authorised incident responders.
R-5: Regulatory Notification Timelines
Services that process personal data or operate under regulated frameworks MUST document and meet the following notification timelines:
| Framework | Notification trigger | Deadline | Recipient |
|---|---|---|---|
| GDPR Art. 33 | Breach of personal data likely to result in risk to individuals | 72 hours from awareness | Lead supervisory authority (e.g., ICO, CNIL, BfDI) |
| GDPR Art. 34 | Breach likely to result in high risk to individuals | Without undue delay | Affected data subjects directly |
| HIPAA §164.308(a)(6) | Breach of unsecured PHI | Without unreasonable delay; max 60 days from discovery | HHS OCR; affected individuals; media if >500 in a state |
| PCI DSS Req. 12.10.4 | Compromise of cardholder data | Immediately (within 24 hours recommended) | Affected card brands and acquirers |
| NIS2 Art. 23 | Significant incident affecting essential/important entity | 24 hours (early warning); 72 hours (notification) | National CSIRT or competent authority |
"Awareness" for GDPR purposes begins when the organisation has reasonable certainty that a breach has occurred — not when investigation is complete.
For P1 incidents, the responsible incident owner MUST evaluate regulatory notification obligations within 1 hour of incident classification and document the outcome (notify or justified no-notify).
R-6: Containment, Eradication, and Recovery Standards
Containment actions MUST be documented with timestamps and approver names. The incident owner MUST confirm before eradication that:
- The attack vector has been identified or the most likely vector is documented
- Logs and evidence have been preserved per R-4
- Regulatory notification obligations have been assessed per R-5
Eradication MUST include verification that the indicator of compromise (IOC) has been removed and not merely hidden. Recovery MUST include a smoke test that validates affected functionality before declaring the incident closed.
R-7: Post-Incident Review
Every P1 and P2 incident MUST produce a post-incident review (PIR) artifact within 5 business days of incident closure. The PIR MUST include:
- Incident timeline (detection, escalation, containment, eradication, recovery)
- Root cause analysis (not just the proximate cause — the systemic contributing factors)
- What worked and what failed during response
- Corrective actions with assigned owners and due dates
- Whether detection and escalation timelines (R-3) were met; if not, why not
PIR artifacts MUST be retained for a minimum of 3 years.
R-8: Tabletop Exercise
Organisations MUST conduct a security incident response tabletop exercise at minimum once per calendar year. The exercise MUST:
- Simulate at minimum one P1-severity scenario relevant to the organisation's threat model
- Test the detection-to-escalation chain and regulatory notification timelines
- Produce a written debrief identifying gaps and corrective actions
- Be repeated after any significant change to the detection toolchain or incident ownership structure
Examples
Incident classification walkthrough
Event: Monitoring alert — authentication failures spike to 500/min on /auth/token
Initial classification: P3 (attempted attack, no confirmed impact)
Investigation (within 4 hours):
- Source: single IP, credential-stuffing pattern (known username list)
- No successful authentications from attack IP
- Rate limiting blocked further attempts after 200 failures
Revised classification: P4 (rate limiting working; no breach; policy violation logged)
Action: Block source IP at WAF; update rate limit thresholds; log to vulnerability register
PIR: Not required (P4); lightweight retrospective note added to runbook
Regulatory notification decision
Event: Database backup file found exposed on public S3 bucket for 6 hours
Data: Contains 12,000 user records (name, email, hashed passwords) — Confidential tier
GDPR notification assessment (within 1 hour of P2 classification):
- Personal data? Yes — names and email addresses
- Risk to individuals? Likely — email addresses enable phishing even without plaintext passwords
- Notification required? YES — Article 33 applies
- Deadline: 72 hours from awareness (awareness = 14:00 UTC Tuesday)
- Deadline: 14:00 UTC Friday
- Notify: ICO (UK), CNIL (France) — two supervisory authorities as data crosses EU/UK borders
Action: File with ICO via casework portal by Thursday 14:00 UTC; supplement with forensic
report when investigation complete
References
- NIST SP 800-61r3 — Computer Security Incident Handling Guide
- GDPR Article 33 — Notification of breach to supervisory authority
- GDPR Article 34 — Communication of breach to data subject
- HIPAA 164.308(a)(6) — Security Incident Procedures
- PCI DSS 4.0 — Requirement 12.10
- NIS2 Directive — Article 23
- SOC 2 Trust Services Criteria — CC7.3–CC7.5
- SEC-STD-004 — Security Event Logging and Monitoring (log preservation)
- SEC-GOV-000 — Security Domain Governance Framework (exception authority)
- SEC-GOV-004 — Security Risk Assessment Framework (incident risk rating)
Rationale
Why govern the technical layer only? Organisational runbooks (who calls whom, communication templates, escalation paths) vary by headcount, jurisdiction, and structure. Prescribing them in a standard either produces compliance theatre (orgs copy the template without customising) or creates a standard that is outdated the moment teams restructure. The standard defines the verifiable, standardisable properties: timelines, classification criteria, notification obligations, evidence preservation. Each organisation implements these in a runbook appropriate to their context.
Why 72-hour GDPR notification instead of "when investigation is complete"? The 72-hour clock starts at awareness of a likely breach — not at completion of forensics. Waiting for certainty is not a valid reason to miss the deadline. When in doubt, notify provisionally with information available, then supplement.
Why mandatory PIR for P1/P2 only? P3/P4 incidents are valuable learning opportunities but requiring a formal PIR for every low-severity event creates process fatigue. Teams SHOULD apply lightweight retrospectives to P3 incidents. The formal PIR requirement for P1/P2 ensures the highest-risk events receive structured analysis.
Version History
| Version | Date | Change |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.0 | 2026-05-05 | Initial definition |